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Abstract 
Venture capital (VC) funded high-tech startups are often cited drivers of economic impact and 
catalysts of regional growth. Public support of high-tech startups and investments into venture 
capital has thus been a popular focus for public policy globally in the past decades. This is 
despite that the long-term, and post-exit, impact of most venture capital funded startups is 
little known, especially for regional development. To the degree startups have been tracked 
after exit, there is evidence of startups both growing and disappearing post-exit, with exit 
route often suggested as an influence of post-exit growth as well as relocation. The purpose of 
this thesis is thus to investigate the suitability of venture capital for regional development, by 
studying the long-term and post-exit outcome for venture capital funded startups. 
This licentiate dissertation builds on four studies on startup exits. The first study, ‘Migration 
patterns of venture capital funded startups’, explores quantitatively startups exits in five 
innovative regions: San Francisco Bay Area encompassing Silicon Valley, Colorado, North 
Carolina, Israel and Sweden. Conclusions are that regional exit patterns are dominated by 
acquisitions, with ownership of the most valuable startups concentrated to Silicon Valley. In 
the other four regions, only a small portion of the value of the startups remain owned in their 
regions. The second study, ‘Growth of Swedish venture capital financed startups after IPO 
and acquisition - the case for exit-centric policy?’, quantitatively tracks the post-exit growth 
of venture capital funded startups in Sweden 1992-2010. Conclusions are that post-exit 
growth is dependent on exit route. Startups which exit by IPO grow faster than acquired 
startups, and half of the acquired startups are consolidated within a couple of years after exit. 
The third study, 'Venture capitalist's exit choice: Deciding the fate of successful 
startups', examines how venture capitalists make exit choices for startups. Conclusions are 
that venture capitalists alone decide on exit, overriding entrepreneurs if required, with a 
preference for acquisition exits and a reluctance to take firms public. The final fourth study, 
‘Startup exits and the evolution of entrepreneurial ecosystems: Exploring divergent paths’, 
maps qualitatively the post-exit behavior of entrepreneurs, business angels, venture capitalists 
and key employees in startups dependent on the financial exit success. Conclusions are that 
growing entrepreneurial ecosystems require a minimum of profitable exits, and without which 
entrepreneurial ecosystems will stagnate and depopulate. 
This thesis increases our understanding the long-term regional economic consequences of 
using venture capital to accelerate startups. Venture capital accelerate startups in the time 
period following their initial investment until the exit. At exit, the venture capitalists have a 
preference of exiting by acquisition, rather than going public, with the most valuable startups 
acquired by firms in Silicon Valley. Acquired startups have lower post-exit growth than 
startups going public, and many acquired startups are consolidated post-exit. For regions other 
than Silicon Valley, the likely outcome is that their most valuable startups will not remain 
long-term in their ecosystems. Regions using venture capital as a policy tool for regional 
growth, should consider modifying their policies to account for the startup migration effects 
and consider supporting alternative funding mechanisms in their entrepreneurial ecosystems.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Startups, Exit, Policy, Venture Capital, Ecosystem.
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1 Introduction 
Venture capital (VC) funded high-tech startups are often cited drivers of economic impact and 
catalysts of regional growth, based on evidence from Silicon Valley with examples such as 
Apple, Facebook and Google (Florida & Kenney, 1988; Gompers et al, 2010; Lerner et al, 
2012; OECD, 2010a). Studies in the U.S., and globally, reinforce that the most successful 
startups contribute a disproportionately large turnover and employment, and by extension, 
economic growth (Shane, 2008, 2009; WEF, 2011). Venture capitalism has spread almost 
worldwide with the expectation that VCs will be a generalized driver of economic growth and 
innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2001). This thesis systematically questions this widely held 
expectation. 
Public support for using venture capital, as a mechanism for identifying and accelerating the 
most promising startups, has hence formed the basis for innovation and entrepreneurship 
policy, as regions have attempted to replicate the success of Silicon Valley (Storey & Tether, 
1998; Lerner, 2009; Lerner et al, 2012; OECD, 2001, 2010b; World Economic Forum, 2009, 
2011). As an example, approximately 35 percent of the €4bn annually raised by private 
European venture capital funds stem frommed European taxpayers through their national and 
regional governments or the European Investment Fund (Höppner, 2015). Government 
agencies contributed over €2bn to European venture capital funds raised in 2018 (Invest 
Europe, 2019). 
The popularity of venture capital as a policy tool for regional development is widespread, 
despite that the long-term, and post-exit, impact of most venture capital funded startups and 
policies to support them remains unknown (Nightingale & Coad, 2013) and that most regions 
fail at replicating Silicon Valley’s success (Rosenberg, 2002). The largest studies on venture 
capital funded startups have only followed the startups until exit, when startups usually are 
acquired or go public (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003; Lerner et al, 2012). What happens to 
startups after exit is outside the scope of most studies, often due to the difficulty of tracking 
firms post-exit (Duruflé et al, 2017).  
To the limited extent post-exit growth of startups has been studied, indications are that 
different exit routes, such as going public or being acquired, lead to divergent post-exit 
growth trajectories for startups (Mason & Harrison, 2006; Mason & Brown, 2013; Brown et 
al, 2017; Carpentier & Suret, 2014; Hogan et al, 2018; Xiao, 2015). The long-term impact of 
startups is to a large extent dependent on the subsequent performance of the startups 
following their exit events. Whether startups remain long-term in their regions of origin, and 
grow post-exit, are important policy concerns (Wennberg & Mason, 2018). There is an 
extensive research gap regarding what happens to startups long-term and post-exit, and 
specifically to venture capital funded startups, whom are the focus for considerable policies. 
As we are unsure about the long-term effects of using venture capital for accelerating startups, 
the question arises whether venture capital is a suitable tool for regional development. 
Based upon the identified research gap, the overall purpose of the thesis is to investigate the 
suitability of venture capital for regional development, by studying the long-term and post-
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exit outcome for venture capital funded startups. In approaching this purpose, we first need to 
map what happens to venture capital funded startups long-term and post-exit on a regional 
basis. Next, we need to understand the connection between exit route, such as foreign 
acquisition or local IPO, and post-exit development of startups on a regional level. 
Furthermore, we need to understand what drives exit decisions for venture capital funded 
startups. Finally, we need to understand the chain of events that lead to exits, the events that 
occur as a results of exits, and what these events mean for regional development. 
The purpose of this thesis is approached by answering three sequential research questions:  
RQ1: What are exit patterns for venture capital funded startups on a regional level? 
RQ2: What is a likely causal chain of events that lead to, and occur as a consequence of, exits 
of venture capital funded startups? 
RQ3: What are key consequences of exits of venture capital funded startups for regional 
development? 
To answer the three research questions, I conducted four studies on startup exits. The first 
study, ‘Migration patterns of venture capital funded startups’, explored quantitatively startups 
exits in five regions: San Francisco Bay Area encompassing Silicon Valley, Colorado, North 
Carolina, Israel and Sweden. The purpose was to investigate how exit patterns for VC-funded 
startups across the five regions, the extent to which regions retain startups in their region and 
which factors are associated with ownership transitions to other regions. Exit patterns 
examined included survival ratios, exit routes, exit transactions amounts and ownership 
transitions within and to other regions. 
The second study, ‘Growth of Swedish venture capital financed startups after IPO and 
acquisition - the case for exit-centric policy?’, quantitatively tracked the pre- and post-exit 
growth of venture capital funded startups founded 1992 – 2010 in Sweden. The sample in this 
second study was smaller and limited to one region compared to the first study, while 
covering a longer time period post-exit. The purpose was to investigate the relationship 
between pre-exit performance, exit route and post-exit performance in terms of turnover, 
employment, growth, intellectual property and finally post-exit continuation or 
discontinuation for venture capital funded startups.  
The third study, 'Venture capitalist's exit choice: Deciding the fate of successful 
startups', examined qualitatively how venture capitalists make exit choices for startups. 
Assuming that exit route matters for the long-term post-exit development of startups, it is 
important to understand how venture capitalists make exit decisions. Aspect of decision 
making investigated included if venture capitalists were sole decision makers, which factors 
they consider, these factors relative importance in the decision and any observable biases that 
influenced the decision making. 
The final fourth study, ‘Startup exits and the evolution of entrepreneurial ecosystems: 
Exploring divergent paths’, mapped qualitatively the post-exit behavior of entrepreneurs, 
business angels, venture capitalists and key employees in startups dependent on the financial 
exit success. The purpose was to explore systemic recycling mechanisms caused by startup 
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exits, through tracking the role transitions of the four participatory agents, entrepreneurs, 
business angels, venture capitalists and key employees. As startup exits may be catalysts of 
reorganization and relocation for startups, one way to understand the dynamics is through the 
participating people leaving the startup for new engagements. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. First, I will review the relevant literature 
for the thesis, including chosen definitions and terminology. Next, I will go over the 
methodologies used in the two quantitative and two qualitative studies. The studies and 
appended papers for each of the four studies will then be summarized with conclusions. 
Following this, the results of the studies will be discussed in relation to theory and the three 
research questions of this thesis. Finally, I conclude by revisiting the purpose, with 
implications for scholars and practitioners, and outline a continued research agenda.  
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2 Literature Review 
Firstly, I begin the literature review section by explaining chosen definitions and terminology, 
to be clear about the meaning of the terms I use, and also serve as an introduction to the 
literature review. Secondly, I review literature in the intersection between venture capital, 
entrepreneurship and regional development research streams, due to the cross-disciplinary 
nature of startup exit research.  
 
2.1 Chosen definitions 
2.1.1 Definition of startup 
Startup has become a common term for an entrepreneurial venture in anything from business 
press to popular TV shows, due to practitioners globally using the term every day. The term 
startup is increasingly used by academics, however often in referring to the startup phase of a 
new entrepreneurial firm’s development which carries a slightly different meaning. Since this 
research studies a practitioner phenomenon, I elect to use the practitioner term startup, as it 
carries a specific meaning. The most commonly used definition of a startup is stated below, as 
popularized by Blank & Dorf in the Startup Owner’s Manual (2012): 
'A startup is a temporary organization in search of a scalable, repeatable, profitable business 
model. At the outset, the startup business model is a canvas covered with ideas and guesses, 
but it has not customers and minimal customer knowledge'. (Blank & Dorf, 2012). 
A startup differentiates itself from a generic new firm in being specifically explorative and 
growth oriented, starting with a limited resource base. A generic new firm does not have these 
requirements; it can use a proven business model for offering a generic product or service, be 
satisfied with not growing and start with a considerable resource base if it is a spin-off or joint 
venture originating from an established firm. Startups thereby constitute a subset of new firms 
with specific characteristics, compared to most other firms studied within entrepreneurship. 
 
2.1.2 Definition of equity funded startup 
Leibenstein (1968) distinguishes between entrepreneurship as a type of management working 
with established conditions and defined markets, and high impact entrepreneurship working 
with Knightian (1921) uncertainty and resulting in Schumpeterian (1934) impact. Acs (2008) 
elaborates that high impact entrepreneurs found and manage leveraged startups which make 
use of external assets, such as investors, to allow their firms to grow faster and go after larger 
business opportunities that ordinary small businesses cannot due to lack of resources. Among 
these external resources leveraged, external equity funding is the most common external 
resource both used and prescribed for faster growth. In short, it means bringing in funding 
from private and institutional investors in return for equity in the firm. The additional capital 
allows the startup to evolve and grow faster than cash flow generated organically from sales 
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and operations would allow. Examples of equity investors are business angels, crowdfunding, 
family offices, venture capitalist funds, corporate venture capitalists and private equity funds 
(Block et al, 2018). 
Equity investors’ capital, however, come with obligations and limitations for entrepreneurs. 
With an extended ownership group including multiple stakeholders, agency changes and 
priorities may diverge. It is therefore common practice in equity funded startups, that bring in 
professional investors, to have a shareholder's agreement, which aligns interests among the 
shareholders and puts procedures in place to control shareholders, board and management. 
Common procedures include restrictions and regulations for trading of shares in the startup, 
so called drag-along and tag-along clauses, designed to facilitate that all shareholders sell 
their shares at the same time. One example of how these clauses are used, is to force minority 
shareholders to sell their shares, in the event that a majority of shareholders wish to sell the 
firm, and the acquiring firm makes the purchase of all outstanding shares a condition for 
completing the transaction (Cumming, 2008). 
 
2.1.3 Definition of venture capital funded startup 
A venture capital funded startup is a startup that has received investment(s) from a formal 
venture capital fund. The formal distinction is important, as the definition of what is venture 
capital has, and still is, debated with different definitions historically used in Europe and the 
USA (Lerner et al, 2009). This thesis uses the more narrow USA definition of formal venture 
capital, as a traditional limited lifetime fund operated by general partners with financing from 
limited partners. This definition excludes for instance family offices, which may call 
themselves venture capitalists, but as they lack limited partners and a limited time fund 
structure do not fit the definition. The distinction matters, as the financial structure of the 
venture capitalist influences their working methods, such as investment and divestment 
processes. A family office is likely to have different investment criteria, process, horizon and 
priorities than a formal venture capital fund. Studies have shown that exit patterns of venture 
capitalists are distinctly different from other private equity investors, for example private 
equity investors are considerably more likely to exit by IPO than venture capitalists are 
(Lerner et al, 2012). 
Venture capital funding is often prescribed as the most effective form of equity funding in 
accelerating startups’ growth (Kortum & Lerner, 2001). The popularity of prescribing venture 
capital may however in part be due to it being the most researched form of equity financing, 
as we have more data and studies on venture capital than alternative equity funding sources, 
and we know in comparison much less about the alternatives  (Cumming & Johan, 2017). 
 
2.1.4 Definition of a startup exit 
Scholars refer to several different types of exits in the context of new firms, so next it is 
important to explain the different types of exits, their meaning and interrelation. 
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Terminology: Subject: Meaning: 
Financial exit Investor An owner of equity sells their equity stake 
Entrepreneurial exit Entrepreneur Entrepreneur leaves the firm they founded 
Firm exit Firm Firm is liquidated or goes bankrupt 
Regional exit Firm Firm relocates their operations to another region 
Startup exit Firm Firm is sold or taken public providing a joint 
  financial exit opportunity for all shareholders 
 
Startup exit is not a new term. When practitioners globally talk about exits, they most 
commonly refer to a startup exit that facilitate financial exits for all shareholders. However, in 
academia the term startup exit is not commonly used, in comparison to the more generic 
financial exit and entrepreneurial exit and firm exit. Startup exit however constitutes a 
specific key mechanisms by itself. The motivation for a startup exit is often the requirement 
for a financial exit by equity investors in the firm. Individual equity investors may attain a 
financial exit by selling their individual shares to another investor. However, equity funded 
startups often restrict the trading of shares by individual investors through the shareholders 
agreement, aligning the interest of the shareholders for all of them to sell their shares jointly. 
The startup exit is the event where all shareholders have the opportunity for a joint financial 
exit, usually through the sale of the entire firm, referred to as Merger & Acquisition (M&A), 
or an Initial Public Offering (IPO) when the firm is listed on a stock exchange. 
Startup exits may act as a catalyst for the other types of exits. An acquisition of a startup is the 
most common startup exit route, facilitating a financial exit for all shareholders. Founders 
may leave their firm in the years following an acquisition, facilitating an entrepreneurial exit. 
Furthermore, is it not unheard of for the acquiring parent firm to relocate and consolidate the 
operations of their new subsidiary to existing business units, for economies of scale, synergies 
and reducing cost. The relocation of operations of the subsidiary to another region would then 
facilitate a regional exit of the subsidiary or even a firm exit if the subsidiary is closed down. 
 
2.2 Venture capital literature related to startup exits 
Venture capital helps fill the early stage equity gap for small firms with high growth potential, 
thereby enabling the startup to grow (Florida & Kenney, 1988). In the last two decades, the 
role of the venture capitalist (VC) has been emphasized as the enabler and accelerator of 
entrepreneurial economic growth (Gompers et al., 2010: Lerner, 2009; Lerner et al., 2012). 
Venture capitalism has spread worldwide with the expectation that VCs will be a generalized 
driver of economic growth and innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2001). The ability to make a 
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profitable exit lies at the heart of venture capital investing (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995; 
Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  
The venture capital exit is more than realizing investment value; it is the process by which the 
efforts of VCs and entrepreneurs are transformed into a new entity (Bygrave et al, 1994). The 
exit timing for the VCs should optimally be ‘when the projected marginal value added as a 
result of the VC’s efforts, at any given measurement interval, is less than the projected cost of 
these efforts’ (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003, p. 6). Several studies show that the average 
holding period for a VC to own an equity stake in a startup before exiting is five years 
(Sahlman, 1990; Cochrane, 2005). 
There are five types of venture capital exits, listed here in argued order of preference for the 
VC (MacIntosh, 1997): (a) an IPO, in which a significant portion of the firm is sold into the 
public market; (b) an acquisition exit; that is, through M&A, in which a third party buys the 
entire firm; (c) a secondary sale, in which only the VC sells its shares to a third party, which is 
usually less desirable and profitable; (d) a buyback, or a management buyout (MBO), in 
which the managers of the entrepreneurial firm repurchases the VC’s shares, which is also 
less desirable and profitable; and (e) a write-off, in which the VC walks away from the 
investment, usually due to bankruptcy or the firm closing down. 
The most profitable exits are IPOs and M&As (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003; Lerner et al., 
2012; Bienz & Leite, 2008). A study of venture capital exits during 1995-2005 in North 
America and Western Europe showed that M&As dominate, with 78.3 percent compared to 
only 3.5 percent as IPOs (Lerner et al, 2009). This is despite the fact that IPOs historically 
provided a 22 percent price valuation premium over M&As (Brau et al, 2003). Although trade 
M&As may result in a lower value, they do provide immediate, full liquidity to investors, 
which is usually not the case in an IPO, in which major shareholders are blocked from selling 
shares during a lock-in period following a listing (De Clerq et al, 2006).  
Firm-specific and macroeconomic factors are linked to exit choice. Larger, dominant, and 
high-tech-based firms are more inclined towards IPOs, while service firms, firms with high 
debt, and firms in leveraged industries and industries with few actors are more M&A inclined. 
In addition, a positive stock exchange trend and lower rates favor IPOs, while the opposite 
favors M&As (Brau et al, 2003, Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2008, Bayar & Chemmanur, 2011). 
Institutional factors enable exits, as countries with stable financial and legal systems are more 
favorable for IPOs (Cumming et al, 2006).  
Management and ownership also influence exits. Companies that need less oversight and have 
a stronger track record are predisposed to IPOs, while companies that require more controls 
are predisposed to M&As (Bienz & Leite, 2008). Established VC firms prefer M&As, while 
younger VC firms are more open to IPOs, especially if an IPO coincides with their fund 
raising (Gompers, 1996). Entrepreneurs are generally biased towards IPOs (Schwienbacher, 
2008), which is one reason VCs often ensure contractual control of the exit choice (Cumming, 
2008; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003). Thus, the VC normally pre-plans the exit route at the time 
of the initial investment (Cumming & Johan, 2008).  
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Although we can expect VCs’ overall exit preferences to be similar internationally, prior 
studies show that specific exit patterns differ between countries and regions due to legal and 
institutional factors (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003), availability of alternative exit routes such 
as small-cap stock exchanges (Rindermann, 2003), and the possibly divergent exit preferences 
of the owners (Schwienbacher, 2008). The importance of exit routes for the development of 
venture capital markets is well known (Mason & Harrison, 1999).  The creation of stock 
markets for smaller growth companies are an important mechanism for a well-functioning 
venture capital market and something that policy makers have tried to stimulate (Isaksson, 
2006). 
As accounted for, venture capital theory focuses on profits for investors and therefore venture 
capital scholars’ interest tends to end with the financial exit. Thus, we know little about post-
exit developments of venture capital funded startups, and whether the type of exit affects a 
venture’s growth and staying-power in the region. From a regional development and public 
investor perspective, these are important questions to ask. There is need for a systematic 
understanding of how venture capital and the type of exits affects pre- and post-exit 
development of startups, with an empirical grounding in more regions than Silicon Valley. 
 
2.3 Entrepreneurship and regional development literature 
related to startup exits 
While venture capital research has been concerned mostly with value creation for investors, 
the intersection of entrepreneurship and regional development research has focused on 
economic impact generated by new firms, primarily in terms of growth and employment 
(Leibenstein, 1968; Baumol, 1996; Audretsch et al, 2006; Shane 2008, 2009). As 
entrepreneurship and regional development theory tend to intertwine on the subject of 
economic impact, and especially so on the subject of startup exits, the literature review of 
entrepreneurship and regional development theory will be done combined. 
Entrepreneurs, and the startups they create, play the economic role of transformational agents 
(Schumpeter, 1934), vehicles of knowledge dissipation and innovation (Acs et al, 2013), and 
net job providers (Birch, 1979, 1987; Kane, 2010). In the last decades, research has 
increasingly focused on leveraged startups, which leverage external assets to accelerate 
growth, and especially leveraging through venture capital (Acs, 2008).  
Venture capital has been portrayed as the engine behind the fast growth of startups (Gompers 
et al., 2010; Lerner et al., 2012). Studies show that venture capital funded startups grow faster 
(Puri & Zarutskie, 2012) and are more innovative (Kortum & Lerner, 2001; Hellmann & Puri, 
2002) than non-venture capital funded startups. However, it is unclear to what degree the 
leveraging effect is due to VCs’ selection bias (Sørensen, 2007), the invested capital itself 
(Wiltbank et al, 2015), the VC’s networking effect (Hochberg et al, 2007) or the VC’s 
governance influence (Hochberg, 2011). 
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Boulevard of Broken Dreams by Lerner (2009) popularized the notion of public investments 
into private venture capital for driving innovation and growth, while warning against the 
potential disruptive interference of government and such policies should thus be with no 
strings attached. High-tech startups, and new technology-based firms (NTBFs), accelerated by 
venture capital funding, became recurring for public policy aiming to drive economic growth 
and innovation in the last decades (Storey & Tether, 1998; OECD, 2001, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c; World Economic Forum, 2009, 2011). 
However, the success of startups is highly skewed, with a small number of firms, such as 
Apple, Google, and Facebook, mostly tied to Silicon Valley, that generate a disproportionate 
amount of the economic impact in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1996; Shane, 2008). This is also the 
case internationally, as a World Economic Forum (WEF) report states that the top one percent 
of early-stage firms contributed 44 percent of the total revenues and 40 percent of total jobs, 
while the top five percent contributed 72 percent of total revenues and 67 percent of total jobs 
(WEF, 2011). The crucial importance of the ‘best’ firms has motivated a focus on High 
Growth Firms (HGFs) in economic growth policy (Delmar et al, 2003; Davidsson & 
Henrekson, 2002; Mason & Brown, 2013; Brown et al., 2014). The most common definition 
of an HGF is ‘Enterprises with average annualized growth in employees or turnover greater 
than 20% per annum, over a three-year period, and with more than 10 employees in the 
beginning of the observation period, should be considered as high growth enterprises’ 
(OECD, 2010a, p. 16). 
Since most of the famous success cases in Silicon Valley exited through IPOs (Shane, 2009), 
the question of the importance of the exit route arises, as most startups exit by acquisition 
(Cuming & MacIntosh, 2003; Lerner, 2009; Lerner et al., 2012). Do acquisitions lead to 
growth and an economic impact, as IPOs seem to do, and to what extent do acquired firms 
grow outside of Silicon Valley? Startups that go public in their region of origin may generate 
more economic growth and other positive regional externalities, implying that IPOs should be 
preferable to acquisitions from a regional development perspective (Mason & Brown, 2013). 
Venture migration is a topic gaining interest (Anokhin, 2013). A case study in the U.K. 
observed a ‘sell-out mentality’ among HGFs, which, coupled with foreign acquisitions, lead 
to startups disappearing abroad (Brown et al., 2017). A recent study of software startups in 
Ireland came to similar conclusions, as foreign acquisitions on average led to a loss of firms, 
employment, and growth for the region of origin (Hogan et al., 2018). If the acquired firms 
are linked to local businesses, then the economic loss for the region of origin may increase 
further (Stam, 2007). 
Case studies in Canada (Carpentier & Suret, 2014) and Israel (Rosenberg, 2002) observe 
patterns of foreign-acquired high-tech firms stagnating as R&D and production satellites, as 
the acquirer transfers the management, finance, and sales functions to head offices elsewhere. 
An Economist article reported similar observations, with Israeli entrepreneurs deciding to 
‘cash in with early exits’ rather than grow their startups into large companies (Ryder, 2014). 
Large corporations often use acquisitions as a primary source for new technology and 
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products, and the associated IP and talent to defend and develop these assets further 
(Granstrand & Sjölander, 1990).  
Acquisitions may lead to the relocation of intellectual assets and human capital, as utilizing IP 
often requires the presence of the engineers who are familiar with the technology, and 
consolidating these assets in one location for synergy makes sense (Makinen et al, 2012; 
Chatterji & Patro, 2014; Sawicki, 2014). Acquisitions often historically led to a transfer of 
employment and growth from peripheral regions to central regions (Leigh & North, 1978; 
Bhagat et al, 1990; Turok & Richardson, 2010; Ashcroft et al, 1994). 
However, it is an oversimplification to say that foreign acquisitions are always detrimental to 
regional development. A post-exit study of Scottish startups included examples of both 
accelerated growth and closures of acquired startups (Mason & Harrison, 2006), so the 
circumstances of the acquisition and acquired firm arguably determine the long-term 
outcomes of these individual cases. Foreign ownership may be beneficial if the parent 
organization helps the startup to overcome barriers to growth and to prosper (Davenport, 
2009; Hopkins & Richmond, 2014, Dahlstrand, 2017). Furthermore, exits may allow the 
entrepreneurs and investors of the original startup to explore new opportunities (Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003), as they found and fund new startups, referred to as ‘entrepreneurial 
recycling’ (Mason & Harrison, 2006).  
In summary, venture capital theory primarily focuses on value creation for investors, with 
economic impact for the surrounding environment as a secondary or even neglected effect of 
the value creation. Exit routes are thereby financial decisions based on assessments of profit 
maximization. From a regional development perspective, IPOs is often argued to generate 
more long-term economic impact and positive externalities for the surrounding region than 
acquisitions. However, IPOs have traditionally only been realistic for a few top-performing 
startups, so the most common profitable exit for venture capitalists has always been the 
M&A. In this context of IPOs being unrealistic for most startups, policy options on exits have 
been limited to considering the comparative benefits and risks of domestic versus foreign 
acquisitions.  
Due to the lack of understanding of what happens post-exit to startups, and Lerner’s (2009) 
warning against government interference, most governments have elected to be exit agnostic 
in their policies. However, before exit-centric policy could be considered we need for 
systematic knowledge about how startups perform post-exit, and how this relates to their exit 
route. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
For the first study, Migration patterns of venture capital funded startups, and second study, 
Growth of Swedish venture capital financed startups after IPO and acquisition - the case for 
exit-centric policy?, the methodological approach needed to be quantitative, as our interest is 
in generalizable trends in populations and correlations to measurable variables. The third 
study, Venture capitalist’s exit choice: Deciding the fate of successful startups, and fourth 
study, Startup exits and the evolution of entrepreneurial ecosystems: Exploring divergent 
paths, could be approached both a qualitatively and quantitatively. However, due to the 
limited amount of prior studies on these topics and limited data access, qualitative 
methodology were chosen to first understand the subject matter through interviews. Based on 
these results, hypotheses can be formulated and tested in future quantitative studies. From 
here onwards, for the sake of brevity, we will refer to the four studies as the Migration (first 
study), Growth (second study), VC Choice (third study) and Ecosystem (fourth study) studies. 
 
3.2 Quantitative methods in Migration and Growth studies 
3.2.1 Data sources, sample and collection 
The Migration study required extensive longitudinal data on venture capital funded startups in 
several countries. Despite the growth of online information and commercial databases, the 
limited reporting requirements for small firms make it a challenging task for researchers in 
most countries to track privately-held firms (Cumming & Johan, 2017). After conducting a 
search of available databases, it became clear that VentureSource offered the best 
international cross-region comparable dataset on venture capital funded startups and exits. 
Other databases I evaluated, such as Crunchbase, PitchBook and CB Insights, had good 
coverage for the USA but not as good international coverage for the 1990-2000s. ¨ 
The five regions were selected to be comparable in population and GDP, have a reputation for 
commercializing research and host established startup and venture capital communities, while 
representing variety in terms of geography, culture and local industry clusters. The five 
selected regions were Colorado, North Carolina, Israel, Sweden and San Francisco Bay Area 
encompassing Silicon Valley. 
Although VentureSource was the best alternative, it contained far from complete and 
comparable records. VentureSource aggregates data from several sources, with limited 
coherent terminology and flaws in reporting. Over a period of two years, we conducted 
considerable data cleanup and repairs filling in the holes in primarily classification of exits, 
acquiring firms and location of acquiring firms. The end result was our own custom built 
relational database, searchable by either firm name or investment round, comprising 10.593 
firms. This custom database was the data source for the Migration and Growth studies. 
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The Growth study required additional financial data on the firms, not contained in 
VentureSource, such as turnover, number of employers, profits and R&D expenditure. For 
this reason, I decided to limit the Growth study to Sweden. In Sweden, all limited companies 
are required by law to submit an annual report, which is available in a public database. A 
second custom database was thereby created and filled over a period of a year with additional 
financials for all Swedish startups from annual reports. As the annual reports contained 
additional written information for the startup related to exits, such as if patents were sold or 
exclusive licensed, this additional information was collected. When the information in the 
annual reports had gaps or was hard to interpret, we collected additional data from the 
Swedish Tax Agency and Swedish Companies Registration Office to substantiate our records. 
The Growth study used both custom databases, to track Swedish venture capital funded 
startups from founding until exit and after exit for as long as the firms was traceable. 
 
3.2.2 Data analysis and limitations 
From the databases, we excluded startups that were not funded by formal venture capital 
funds and firms that did not meet the startup definition. Not all investors in a venture capital 
database meet the criteria for being a formal venture capital fund, as they are business angels, 
family offices and general private equity firms that may co-invest with venture capital funds 
or may just have the wrong label in the database. Furthermore, as venture capitalists are 
opportunists, they may invest in spin-offs and mature companies that do not meet our startup 
definition (Gompers et al, 2019; Berglund, 2011; Harrison, Mason and Smith, 2015). 
In the Migration study, we began with descriptive statistics to map out the commonalities and 
differences in the exit patterns for the five regions. After illustrating generalizable patterns 
across the regions, we used regression test to show correlations between exits and region, 
industry and valuation with varying degree of statistical significance.  
In the Growth study, we analyzed the data in five steps. In the first step, we established the 
pre-exit performance of all startups one year before exit and ranked exit routes based on the 
pre-exit performance. In the second step, we mapped the degree to which the exited startups 
continued operations post-exit, either in their existing format or a new one. In the third step, 
we established the post-exit performance of startups still in operation three years post-exit, 
and ranked post-exit performance of the startups related to exit route. In the fourth step, we 
examined the startups which met the HGF definition pre- and post-exit. In the final fifth step, 
we investigated if the startups that discontinued operations post-exit were the best or worst 
performing startups. Due to the skewed, non-Gaussian distribution of performance in the 
sample, we use an omnibus Wilcoxon one-way median analysis to test the differences in the 
medians between several groups. If the null hypothesis was rejected, we also conducted 
statistical multiple comparison analysis using the Wilcoxon test for each pair. For the HGF 
comparison, we use a Chi-Square Cramer’s V test. 
The methodology used for both studies should have a sufficient degree of construct validity. 
The samples represent our best effort to in achieving as complete as possible coverage for the 
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venture capital funded startups in the regions during the selected time periods, and constitute 
several years of work in validating and complementing the data by hand. It is possible we 
missed some startups despite our best efforts, however the statistical significance in many of 
our tests would suggest our coverage was sufficient for statistical testing purposes. As we use 
data collected directly from the firms, there should also be a sufficient degree of internal 
validity and objectivity. The methodology used in the Migration study would further be 
highly repeatable and transferable for future studies in other geographies. The methodology 
used in the Growth study would practically be less transferable for practical reasons, as access 
to annual reports is usually more restricted in other countries than Sweden. 
The most important limitation in the Migration study is the study the assumption that transfer 
of ownership leads to long-term relocation of startup operations. However, the Growth study 
in part addresses this limitation, by substantiating this assumption as real in the context of 
Sweden. The most important limitation in the Growth study is that we do not know what 
happened with the discontinued acquired startups that are consolidated and integrated into the 
parent firm. Since the consolidated startups are intermingled with the parent firm after 
integration, we cannot know what actual growth and impact the former startup had post-exit. 
Thus, we can only base our conclusions and what we see and not what we cannot see. 
Tracking the acquired startups post-consolidation would require a different research design 
and methodology. 
 
3.3 Qualitative methods in VC Choice and Ecosystem 
studies 
3.3.1 Data sources, sample and collection 
Due to the lack of prior studies on the VC Choice and Ecosystem studies, regarding venture 
capitalists’ decision making on startup exits and the influence of startup exits on the career 
paths of participatory agents in an entrepreneurial ecosystem, I decided to use qualitative 
methods to build an understanding of the subject matters. As I expected heterogeneity within 
the sample, and it was unclear what variables would be important in the studies, it would have 
been presumptuous and premature to go for a quantitative method with hypothesis testing. I 
further decided to limit both studies to the Swedish entrepreneurial ecosystem. As local 
conditions could be an influence in both studies, I thought it prudent to conduct the qualitative 
studies within the confines of one ecosystem. 
There is ambiguity as to ‘where an ecosystem starts and where it ends’ (Ahokangas et al, 
2018). It may be therefore be contentious to refer to the Swedish entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
as Sweden is a national level rather than regional or metropolitan where entrepreneurial 
ecosystems are often expected to operate (Audretsch & Belitski, 2017). However, I adopt the 
socio-cultural perspective that the shared community marks the boundaries of the ecosystem 
(O’Connor et al, 2018; Acs et al, 2017). In the case of Sweden, the community of startup 
professionals refers to itself as the ‘Swedish’ startup community. Business angels and venture 
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capitalists invest across all hubs, while entrepreneurs and employees may transfer between the 
hubs when engaging in new ventures, with a transit time between the major startup hubs in the 
ecosystem of two to four hours (Eriksson & Rataj, 2019). 
The Swedish entrepreneurial ecosystem is one of the older established ecosystems outside of 
the USA. The first Swedish venture capital firm was established in 1973 and the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem has since evolved through four decades of startup activity to 
become relatively stable and mature (Lerner & Tåg, 2013; Karaomerlioglu & Jacobsson, 
2000; Isaksson, 1998). Startups with well-known brands which originate from Sweden are for 
example Skype, Klarna, Spotify, Mojang with MineCraft and King with Candy Crush. 
Sweden provides a European baseline for future comparisons to other ecosystems, being 
successful enough to merit investigation while smaller in scale and thereby easier to relate to 
than Silicon Valley.  
For the VC Exit Choice study, the sample was limited to twelve Swedish venture capitalists. 
Previous qualitative studies have yielded interesting findings with interviews with only twelve 
venture capitalists (Berglund, 2011). The sampling criteria were that they (a) were traditional 
venture capitalists, in the sense that they invested other peoples’ money and had limited 
partners they were responsible to, (b) had experience from multiple exits and were familiar 
with the exit choice decision-making context and (c) were Swedish. Within these criteria, I 
sampled for variety in experience, from less than two to more than twenty-five years as 
venture capitalists, and variety in industry focus, from generalist to healthcare and ICT. 
For the Ecosystem study, the sampling criteria was that they were veterans of the ecosystem, 
with at least fifteen years actively working in the ecosystem with insight into how participants 
in startups continued their careers post-exit. Respondents were sampled through snowball 
networking (Noy, 2008), starting with the people who had spent the longest time in the 
ecosystem and ensuring diversity in background among respondents in terms of distribution 
geographically across all the three largest hubs as well as variety in present role and 
background. Final sample consisted of seventeen respondents, comprised of nine venture 
capitalists, four executives from incubators and four business angels. Three of the seventeen 
respondents were women. No entrepreneurs were among the final respondents. Entrepreneurs 
interviewed within the study expressed that they had primarily experienced their own 
journeys and had limited insight into the transition patterns for the other participatory agents, 
and were therefore excluded from the sample. 
Data collection in both studies was through recorded structure interviews, as differences in 
framing of questions could affect outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Deviation from the 
protocol was only to ask follow-up questions, if an interviewee answer was vague or unusual 
and warranted further explanation (Brinkmann, 2014). The role of the interviewer was to ask 
questions, guide the interviewee through the protocol and make observations. Interviewees are 
offered anonymity to facilitate their honest participation (Opdenakker, 2006). In terms of 
interview questions, both studies had a somewhat novel approach tailored to their purposes. 
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In the case of the venture capitalist study, the interviewer guided the interviewees through the 
steps of the structured decision making process. We need to go beyond heuristics, which 
constitute black box solutions simplifying a more complex set of assessments and 
incorporating several biases specific for certain context, and thereby make generalization and 
comparisons over a larger population problematic (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). Instead, we 
need to deconstruct the decision making process into steps, to isolate the individual factors 
considered, ascertain their relative importance and identify the influence of underlying biases 
in deciding on startup exit.  
Furthermore, by conducting the decision making in steps, we can vary the context to consider 
in each step and thereby see which factors are context dependent. By refraining from 
providing the interviewee with which factors to consider, we minimizing the risk of 
confirmation bias of the interviewer influencing the interview. This approach is similar to 
talk-aloud protocol, a version of think-aloud protocol (Van Someren et al, 1994), in that we 
ask respondents to make decisions and explain their reasoning, with the relaxed requirement 
that we do not require respondents to speak continuously and they are allowed breaks to think.  
In the case of the ecosystem study, the interviewer asked interviewees to individually map the 
expected post-exit behavior of four participatory actors, based on five different levels of 
financial exit success. The four participatory actors were nascent entrepreneurs, business 
angels, venture capitalists and startup employees. The five levels of financial exit success 
were formulated as industry practice Cash-on-Cash Multiples (Gompers et al, 2019). This 
would enables us to aggregate and quantify the veterans’ expectations of “how things usually 
go”, based on having seen dozens of startups from founding to exit and the continued post-
exit career of the agents. 
Respondents were asked to distribute hundred percent probability between their choices for 
each agent in each scenario. The percentages were not used for statistical analysis, as the 
sample was too small to allow for this, but rather as a method for assigning level of 
importance, clarifying contrast and establishing trends in answers across respondents. If the 
respondents irrespective of each other mapped approximately the same post-exit behavior of 
the agents, the pattern should be representative of their shared view of the ecosystem 
mechanics. The purpose was to unveil the perceived relation between increasing level of 
returns and agent role transitions, to investigate the cyclical recycling mechanics of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
In both studies, white boards were used to facilitate data collection more effectively by 
writing down respondents’ answers using visualization to capture the systemic patterns 
(Eppler & Platts, 2009). Visualizing for the respondents what they answered in the sequential 
questions allowed the respondents to consider and compare their answers and adjust their 
answers until their believed their final coherent answers were correct. The white board 
answers were always photographed at the conclusion of the interviews and was additional 
input into the data analysis. Finally, body language and pauses were observed and recorded as 
input in the venture capitalist interview study. 
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3.3.2 Data analysis and limitations 
Data collected in the interviews was compared across the interviewees, to understand the 
degree of convergence or divergence in the data. Answers with a high degree of convergence 
form a baseline for proposed descriptive models and hypotheses for future quantitative 
testing. Diverging answers need to be analyzed with the background of interviewee and 
context that the questions were asked in mind, to understand why the answers diverge. In the 
VC Exit Choice study, the result should be a proposed descriptive decision-making model that 
may be tested in a future quantitative study. In the Ecosystem study, the results should be a 
post-exit career model and ecosystem dynamics model, which may be tested in a future 
quantitative studies. 
Both studies should have a sufficient degree of construct validity, as attention was given to 
prior theory in constructing the research questions and interview protocol. The interviewees 
were representative for their populations and with a high degree of convergence in their 
answers the results should hold a sufficient degree of validity for qualitative findings. Future 
studies should be able to reproduce comparable results using the same methodologies, making 
the studies repeatable and transferable. The protocols were designed to minimize risks for the 
interviewer to influence the findings and ensure a sufficient degree of objectivity, and are 
publicized with the articles for use in future studies.  
The most important limitation of the VC Exit Choice study is the limited sample and that the 
findings are presently specific for Swedish venture capitalists. Future studies will need to test 
if the model is generalizable for an international population of venture capitalists. The same 
limitations are relevant for the Ecosystem study. However, the Ecosystem study has the 
additional limitation that it maps expected behavior rather than actual behavior. A quantitative 
testing of the ecosystem models should take test against actual behavior, although this is 
likely to be an extensive and prolonged process requiring tracking of thousands of individuals 
of at least a decade. Simulations may prove a more accessible research path forward. 
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4 Summarized Papers 
4.1 Paper 1: Migration patterns of venture capital funded 
startups 
The purpose of this first paper is to study migration of VC-funded startups across five regions, 
the extent to which regions retain startups in their region and which factors are associated 
with ownership transitions to other regions. The premise for the study is the realization that 
how venture capital (VC) investors in a startup choose to exit their investment, such as by a 
merger and acquisition (M&A) or initial public listing (IPO), may determine the long-term 
growth trajectory and even the regional outmigration of startups. Another part of the premise 
is investigate if exit patterns may explain part of Silicon Valley’s success and why other 
regions find it so difficult to replicate. 
The five region investigated were San Francisco encompassing Silicon Valley, Colorado, 
North Carolina, Israel and Sweden. 10.593 startups, founded 1992-2011, were analyzed 
through descriptive statistics and regression tests. Exit patterns examined included survival 
ratios, exit routes, exit transactions amounts and ownership transitions to other regions. 
Results were discussed by contrasting venture capital with regional development theory, to 
understand the startup exit phenomenon from the perspectives of different stakeholders. 
We found that exit patterns were generalizable on a region level for venture capital funded 
startups, with M&As as the dominant exit route. To the degree IPOs occur, they were rare and 
most often occur in life science related industries. Differences between regions were mainly 
in founding rates, exit transaction amounts and ownership migration. We found that in Silicon 
Valley over 50 percent of successful startups, representing almost 60 percent of the exit value, 
are likely to stay within the region when VCs exit. In contrast, across the other four, smaller 
but still representative innovative regions, less than a third of successful startups, representing 
only 15 percent of the total reported values, were likely to remain owned within the regions 
they originated after the VCs exit. 
Conclusions were that exit patterns are important and may in part explain Silicon Valley’s 
success. The most valuable startups are founded and exit locally in Silicon Valley or are 
acquired by Silicon Valley incumbents from other regions. In the other regions, the most 
valuable startups exit to other regions and only a small portion of the value of the startups 
remains owned in the region of origin for the startup. This concentration to Silicon Valley is 
the strongest within the traditional Silicon Valley industries, however the trend of ownership 
concentration is evident across all industries, effectively forming an advantage which begets 
further advantage resembling self-reinforcing Matthew effect. It will be close to impossible 
for other regions to replicate the success of Silicon Valley, if their most valuable startups 
consistently relocate from their region and specifically to Silicon Valley. 
Main theoretical contributions to venture capital theory is that our results of M&As 
dominating exit returns, contradict the often cited belief in venture capital theory of IPOs as 
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‘the gold standard of exits’ (Lerner et al, 2012, p.201). Furthermore, this dominance of M&As 
motivates a reinterpretation of the role venture capitalists play in the global economy. Venture 
capitalists play a more important role as sourcing agents for incumbents, revitalizing existing 
industry clusters, than as midwives of new public companies and new industry clusters.  
Contributions to regional development theory is that the interdependence between regions and 
entrepreneurial ecosystems, as evident in our results of exit patterns, are underestimated in 
present theory. We propose that Silicon Valley, and the other regions studied, could be seen 
as a network of nodes organized as a supply chain. The specialization of Silicon Valley has 
expanded from industry clustering, to a specialization of financing and commercializing 
future technologies. Other regions effectively serve as supply hubs, incubating and cultivating 
promising startups, from which their best startups are later sourced for integrating into the 
technology commercialization machinery comprised of Silicon Valley incumbents. 
 
4.2 Paper 2: Growth of Swedish venture capital financed 
startups after IPO and acquisition - the case for exit-
centric policy? 
The first paper on startup migration in five regions, revealed the dominance of acquisitions as 
an exit route and the concentration of ownership of the most valuable startups to the 
technology clusters in Silicon Valley. However, the economic impact is dependent on the key 
assumption that ownership matters to the long-term spatial organization of operations for 
former startups. Are acquired startups in particular consolidated over time to the region where 
the parent corporation is located, effectively migrating the value they represent and generate 
away from the region of origin of the startup? 
The purpose of this second paper is to investigate if and how exit routes of venture capital 
financed startups matter from a regional development perspective, i.e. to what extent firms 
stay and grow post-exit dependent upon exit.  The practical intent is to better understand the 
consequences of existing venture capital policy and substantiate arguments for policy to 
become more exit-centric. The empirical research question was: How do venture capital 
funded startups perform post-exit related to exit route?  
To answer the question, we used annual reports to conduct a nation-wide exploration of the 
post-exit performance of venture capital funded startups. Our sample consists of 273 venture 
capital funded startups founded in Sweden 1992-2010 and exited by Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in 2002-2017. In exit routes, we distinguished 
between IPOs on larger regulated stock exchanges and smaller Multilateral Trading Facilities 
(MTFs) and between domestic and foreign acquisitions. Performance variables measured 
were absolute and relative growth of turnover and employees, with indicators for high-growth 
firm (HGF), inorganic growth (IG) and intellectual property (IP) to provide explanatory input.  
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We found that the pre-exit performance of the startups directly related to exit route. The top 
three percent startups exit by IPO on large stock exchanges. Among the remaining startups, 
the best performers go first to foreign acquirers, then domestic acquirers and last list 
themselves on small stock exchanges (MTFs). However, the different exit routes lead to 
divergent post-exit growth trajectories. IPOs, both on large and small stock exchanges, 
resulted in the strongest post-exit performance. Foreign and domestic acquired startups 
experienced a reduction in relative growth as subsidiaries post-exit, a reduction in employees 
and as well as a reduction in development and ownership of intellectual property (IP). Finally, 
approximately half of the acquired startups, both domestic and foreign, were closed down 
post-exit. This finding supports the assumption in the first study, that acquired startups are 
consolidated over time to the region where the parent corporation is located. 
Main theoretical contribution was evidence that exit route directly influenced long-term 
economic impact. Regional economic policy for startups thereby should be exit cognizant and 
exit-centric. MTFs offers a promising lower threshold exit route for startups going public, 
while the startups that exit by IPO on MTF had the largest relative growth post-exit. This 
makes MTFs relevant to consider for future exit-centric policy.  
 
4.3 Paper 3: Venture capitalist's exit choice: Deciding the 
fate of successful startups 
As the previous two papers revealed the importance of exit route for long-term economic 
impact, the question rose of who decides on exit route for a startup and on what basis. 
Previous studies have indicated that venture capitalists often decide on exit, plan for the exit 
from the initial investment and usually ensure contractual control over the exit decision 
(Cummings, 2008).However, it remains unclear on what basis the exit decision is made. 
Therefore, the third paper examined how venture capitalists (VCs) choose exit route for 
startups, which factors they consider and these factors relative importance. Qualitative 
structured interviews were conducted with VCs, stepping through their preferences in 
deciding between Initial Public Offerings (IPO) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as 
well as domestic and foreign exits. The VCs identified the risks and uncertainties they 
associated with each exit route and the rewards required to compensate for these risks and 
uncertainties. Biases in decision making were observed and inquired about. Findings were 
that the factors considered by the VCs are uniform, but the perceived importance of these 
factors strongly diverged. 
The VCs perceived themselves to be sole deciders of exit route, overriding entrepreneurs if 
required. VCs had preference for exit by M&A and aversion to IPOs, due to the uncertainty 
associated with the IPO’s lockup period. The magnitude of the IPO aversion was dependent 
on individual VCs familiarity with IPOs, loss of control issues and loss aversion. An 
empirically derived descriptive model was proposed for how VCs make exit choice, which 
could be validated in the future with statistical testing.  
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Results offer an explanation to the over-representation of M&As as exit route. Furthermore, 
the relatively low threshold to foreign acquisitions offer an explanation for the high number of 
foreign acquisitions in Sweden and that bulk of the most valuable startups exit by foreign 
acquisition. Implications for policy was that the VC’s sole deciding power, strong M&A 
preference, low threshold to foreign M&As and aversion to IPOs may be counterproductive to 
policies for regional growth. Implications for practitioners was that VC’s IPO aversion may 
be limiting earnings for all startup shareholders. 
 
4.4 Paper 4: Startup exits and the evolution of 
entrepreneurial ecosystems: Exploring divergent paths 
The previous three papers have found that regions other than Silicon Valley (San Francisco 
Bay Area) should be prepared for the likely outcome that the most valuable startups in their 
entrepreneurial ecosystems will be acquired and migrate from their regions long-term. This 
realization highlights the crucial importance of post-exit recycling of capital and talent within 
the ecosystem. An entrepreneurial ecosystem may thrive even though the majority of their 
successful startups leave, provided that the majority of the profits and experience startup 
professionals return to the ecosystem to found, finance and support new startups. 
 
Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Ecosystem (EE) as a circular three layer system 
The fourth paper conceptualizes entrepreneurial ecosystems (EEs) as a circular three layer 
system with startup exits driving its evolution, as seen above in Figure 1. The core of the 
ecosystem are startup firms (layer 1). Surrounding them is a community of four active types 
of agents who participate in developing the startups: entrepreneurs, business angels, venture 
capitalists and key employees (layer 2). The outermost layer is a broader support community, 
consisting of the regional workforce and the institutions such as universities, agencies, 
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incubators/accelerators and professional networks that sustain and anchor the ecosystem in the 
surrounding region (layer 3).  
The engine of the ecosystem are the startups in conjunction with their directly participating 
agents. The study examine how successful exits, or lack of them, shapes the evolution 
trajectory of the ecosystem via the transitions it triggers into, away from, and across 
participatory roles. The empirical data served to substantiate and illustrate the concept of EEs 
as a circular three layer system with startup exits driving its evolution over time. The 
repopulation of an EE from within is primarily done by employees becoming entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurs becoming angels and to a lesser degree VCs. However, with a minimum 
level of profitable exits, the EE would instead stagnate and eventually depopulate, as all but 
the most stubborn entrepreneurs and employees are expected to leave the EE. 
However, the expected post-exit transitions for VCs are less stable, with a binary split 
between grow (3x-100x exits) or leave (failure-1.5x exits) and little middle ground of 
continuing with the same fund (1.5x-3x). Maintaining a stable and sustainable VC community 
in an EE may therefore be challenging given the grow-or-perish dynamics of VC investing. 
These dynamics could in part explain the early stage funding gap and that EEs have been 
struggling with (Murphy & Edwards, 2003; Barr et al, 2009; Duruflé et al, 2017). If early 
stage venture capitalists are prone to transition, if unsuccessful by closing down and if 
successful by transitioning to later stages, there would need to be a consistent inflow of early 
stage VCs to fill the gap of those transitioning out. Furthermore, if the inflow of new VCs is 
proportional to the success of the EE, then the inflow of new early stage VCs would mainly 
occur if the EE was already in a growth trajectory. Policies aimed at establishing early stage 
venture capitalists in EEs may only offer temporary solutions to early stage funding gaps.  
This reflects broader theoretical insights that track records of success over time build a 
reputation of success and a halo effect on an institutional level (Sine et al, 2003) via the 
signaling effects of liquidity events (Sorenson and Stuart, 2003). With a growing reputation, 
an increase in inflow of talent and investments would logically follow and the pattern for the 
non-nascent agents would likely follow similar patterns. In summary, our results enable us to 
postulate that successful exits shape the evolution trajectory of the EE via the transitions it 
triggers into, away from, and across participatory roles in the EE. Policy implications were 
significant; growing entrepreneurial ecosystems requires successful exits. Without successful 
exits, it is only a matter of time until ecosystems stagnate and depopulate.  
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5 Discussion 
5.1 What are exit patterns for venture capital funded 
startups on a regional level? 
The Migration study of five regions showed the dominance of acquisitions as an exit route, 
and how the most valuable startups migrated in ownership towards Silicon Valley. The VC 
Choice study supports this pattern of value migration, as Swedish venture capitalists prioritize 
profit maximization in deciding on exit, with a preference for acquisitions and a low threshold 
to foreign acquisition which they expect to provide higher exit valuations. The results are in 
line with previous studies regarding the acquisition bias of VCs (Lerner et al, 2009; 
Cummings, 2008). However, the value migration specifically to Silicon Valley has not been 
accounted for in literature before. 
The Growth study further substantiate these results, by revealing the how the bulk of the best 
performing startups, which should be the most valuable, are acquired by firms from outside of 
Sweden. The Growth study also revealed that approximately half of the acquired startups 
were consolidated within a couple of years post-exit. The remaining startups, now 
subsidiaries, experienced a reduction in relative growth, employees and intellectual property 
(IP) after exit.  
These results are supported by both historical studies on industrial era acquisitions and 
consolidation (Leigh & North, 1978; Bhagat et al, 1990; Turok & Richardson, 2010; Ashcroft 
et al, 1994) and modern studies on startup acquisition and consolidation (Brown et al., 2017; 
Hogan et al., 2018; Carpentier & Suret, 2014). There is a variation in the sample, so there are 
acquisitions that experience an increase in growth post-exit as some previous studies have 
indicated (Davenport, 2009; Hopkins & Richmond, 2014, Dahlstrand, 2017), however, the 
consolidation effects seem to dominate over the growth effects post-exit. Nevertheless, the 
correlation between higher performance and foreign acquisition, and the correlation of 
reduced relative post-exit performance and acquisitions, are novel empirical findings. 
Together with the exit patterns and value migration insights, they expand our system level 
understanding of what leads to acquisitions and what the consequences of acquisitions are.  
There were, of course, factors which introduced variation in the overall exit patterns. Startups 
in life science, biotech, pharma and cleantech were considerably more likely to exit by IPO 
than other startups. Additionally, the availability of low thresholds stock exchanges in 
Sweden (MTFs) in the Growth study, was a popular exit route for the startups with lower 
performance, but potential future growth. Startups which exiting by IPO experienced stronger 
post-exit growth and higher likelihood of continued operations, compared to acquired 
startups. These results are supported by previous studies that have proposed that IPOs are a 
preferable exit route for regional growth (Mason & Brown, 2013).  
In the VC Choice study, VCs explained the IPO bias in certain industries with the longer 
development cycle and thus higher capital requirements to reach break-even. These startup are 
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thus harder to find acquirers for and more logical to instead recapitalize through an IPO. VCs 
also assigned a sentimental value to owning shares in quote ‘save the world from disease and 
pollution’ types of startups, making them well suited for taking public. 
The presence of business angel investors reduced the likelihood of an acquisition by a firm in 
another region, as seen in the Migration study. This suggests either a selection bias among 
business angels, in that startups they invest in are more prone to local exits, or that business 
angels influence the exit decisions to a greater extent than anticipated and reported by VCs in 
the VC Choice study. The mitigating influence of industry, low threshold stock exchanges and 
business angel investments on exit route patterns, are novel insights previously not mention in 
the literature.  
In the fourth study, we did not distinguish between exit routes, but instead examine how 
different levels of financial exit success drive the post-exit role transition of the agents in an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem (EE). An important finding of the study was that a minimum level 
of profitable exits were required to sustain and grow any EE dependent on equity investors. 
On a system level, EEs thereby require a minimum level of profitable exits, locals exit and 
recycling mechanisms for sustainable long-term growth. However, the minimum level of 
profitability required for continued investments was considerably higher for VCs than 
business agents (BAs). An EE reliant on primarily VCs, with a limited BA community, is 
thereby more vulnerable and less resilient than an EE with a larger BA community and a 
smaller VC community. 
 
5.2 What is a likely causal chain of events that lead to, and 
occur as a consequence of, exits of venture capital 
funded startups? 
Combining the findings from the four studies with theory, I construct a likely causal chain of 
events for startup exits. The proposed chain of events serve three purposes. First, it illustrates 
how the decisions made in each step leads to the conditions in the following step, until the 
final outcome is reached. Secondly, it allows us to analyze and substantiate the patterns and 
influencing factors in each step. Third, it allows us to consider which factors could be 
influenced by stakeholders to provide an alternative final outcome.  
The proposed main chain of events starts by setting the preconditions for startup exits and 
continues by triggering the startup exit process, to the condition which decide exit route, and 
ends with the post-exit consequences of different exit routes. In each step of the chain of 
events, I also discuss likely conditions for deviations. The proposed chain of events is 
presented below: 
1. Startup exit preconditions 
Founders invite venture capitalists to invest in their startup. As part of the investment 
terms, venture capitalists are promised an exit within a certain timeframe and given 
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contractual control over the exit decision (VC Choice study; Cumming, 2008). Venture 
capitalists often have an exit strategy formulated for the startup from the point of their 
initial investment (Cumming & Johan, 2017). 
Deviations: It is rare, but not unheard of, that founders can avoid giving contractual control 
of the exit to venture capitalists. If business angels also invest in the startup, it may 
influence the exclusive contractual control venture capitalists often have. 
 
2. Triggering startup exit process 
If the startup is successful enough to survive to become an attractive exit opportunity, a 
startup exit process will eventually be initiated. The trigger may be an outside bid to 
acquire the startup or a shareholder initiating the process from the inside. As the venture 
capitalists has contractual control, they effectively control the exit process (VC Choice 
study; Cumming, 2008). 
Deviations: If venture capitalist do not have contractual control, a shareholder majority 
will make the exit decision as agreed upon in the shareholders agreement. Furthermore, if 
the startup manages to survive, but fails to present an attractive exit opportunity, venture 
capitalists may exit by management buy-out (MBO), where the startup is sold back to the 
founders, or by closing down or liquidating the startup. 
 
3. Deciding startup exit route 
The exit route is decided by the venture capitalist based on the highest expected profit, 
taking into account the expected exit valuation of the startup in different exit route and the 
risks and uncertainties associated with each exit route (VC Choice study). There is a bias in 
this decision making towards acquisition exits (Cumming, 2008; VC Choice study), with a 
low threshold to selling the startup to acquirers in other regions and in comparison high 
threshold to taking a startup public due to uncertainties associated with the lock-in period 
(VC Choice study). 
 The characteristics of a startup also influences the exit route. The largest, highest 
performing and most valuable startups are mostly acquired by firms in other regions, with 
a smaller fraction go public on large stock exchanges (Migration and Growth studies). The 
remaining startups are acquired locally or, if available in their region, go public on local 
low threshold stock exchanges (Migration and Growth studies). Industry also influences 
exit route, with startups in life science, biotech, pharma and cleantech, more likely to exit 
by going public (Migration and VC Choice studies). 
Deviations: In Silicon Valley, the most valuable startups go public or are acquired locally 
and the less valuable are acquired by firms in other regions (Migration study). 
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4. Post-exit consequences, by exit route 
Acquired startups, both local and out of region acquisitions, are to a large extent 
consolidated and absorbed by their parent firms (Growth study). If the parent firm is based 
in another region, the consequence is that the former startup is consolidated to another 
region, while a local acquisition entails a local consolidation within the region. The 
remaining acquired startups, fully owned subsidiaries, experience a relative reduction in 
growth, employees and ownership of intellectual property post-exit as subsidiaries of larger 
firms (Growth study). Startups that go public, on large or small stock exchanges, 
experience a continued post-exit growth, compared to the acquired startups that continue as 
subsidiaries (Growth Study). 
Deviations: There is a high variation among startups divided by exit route. Although the 
post-exit growth patterns are statistically significant, individual firms may deviate from the 
pattern. Furthermore, as the post-exit growth patterns are based on the Growth study in 
Sweden, we have yet to substantiate the post-exit growth pattern by exit route in other 
regions. 
 
Next, I analyze each event in the chain, to consider which variables could be influenced for a 
different final outcome. The entire chain is initiated by the founders accepting venture capital 
investments, with the conditional exit and contractual exit control. If founders were to finance 
the development of their startup without external equity funding, by bootstrapping and relying 
on customer revenues and loans, there would be no external requirement for an exit. Founders 
would under these circumstances experience a slower development of their startup, but be in 
sole ownership and control of their startup. A study comparing growth of new firms with and 
without equity investments found that startups with equity investments grew faster, but due to 
the equity dilution of ownership, founders of both types of firms ended up with similar profit 
after exit in the end (Wiltbank et al, 2015). We need to remember that venture capital is not a 
requirement to successfully grow a startup; it accelerates growth but at a price for founders. 
A middle ground for founders could be to rely on other external equity financing than venture 
capital, such as business angel, family offices and crowdfunding. These equity investors 
require an eventual financial exit, but may be more flexible on the circumstances for the exit. 
Venture capitalists invest other people’s money, sourcing capital from limited partners with a 
limited lifetime fund and thereby need to ensure they can exit and liquidate their fund in time. 
These other equity investors invest their own money, so they can afford to be more flexible 
regarding the time frame in which the exit is done, the format of the exit and not demand sole 
contractual control of the exit. For founders, these equity investors may not match venture 
capitalists in amount of capital they can invest, but they can invest enough and demand less. 
Due to the lack of research on divestments and exit done by business angels, family offices 
and crowdfunding, we can only speculate in that these investors have a different exit behavior 
than venture capitalists. However, as they invest their own money, rather than other people’s, 
and thereby have more flexibility, it is feasible that they would act differently. This 
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proposition is supported by the fact that startups with both venture capital and business angel 
investments were more likely to exit locally, as seen in this thesis (Migration study). 
There are examples of shrewd founders that receive venture capital investments, but avoid 
giving away contractual exit control. However, there is little research on how they accomplish 
this feat, and one can only speculate that it is due to exceptional expertise and bargaining 
position. Once founders have accepted venture capital investments, and the associated 
contractual exit control, founders primarily influence the exit of the startup by influencing the 
performance of the startup. The better the startup performs and grows, the more likely 
founders are to be replaced as CEO (Wasserman, 2003) and the higher is the likelihood of an 
exit of choice for the venture capitalist. However, if the startup is unsuccessful, founders are 
likely to see their startup liquidated, so their fortunes are linked to the success of the startup. 
Once the exit process has been initiated, the exit route is dependent on firm characteristics and 
local conditions. Certain industries are more prone for exit by IPO (Migration and VC Choice 
studies) and local IPO conditions matter, such as in Sweden where MTFs are more frequent. 
For the highest performing startups, the choice is between an outbound acquisition or IPO on 
a large stock exchange. For the startups with lower performance, the choice is between a local 
acquisition or IPO on a small stock exchange if available. In Silicon Valley, the conditions are 
reversed for acquisitions, with the highest performing startups exiting locally. The options for 
influencing exit routes through policy are however limited this late in chain of events. 
Regions could bolster the accessibility of local stock exchanges and encourage local 
acquisitions through matchmaking (Growth study). 
After the startup exit event, the growth trajectories of the former startups is to a degree set. 
Public companies are expected to a large extent continue to grow, while among acquired 
startups different degrees of consolidation will take place (Growth study). A deciding factor 
will be to what extent, and how fast, consolidation to other regions will take place for those 
startups acquired by outside incumbents. Local anchoring strategies and local cluster 
synergies may mitigate the migration pull to other regions (Mason & Brown, 2013). However, 
the earlier in a chain of events an intervention is made, the easier it is to influence to later 
consequences. After the exit event has occurred, policy options are more limited. 
 
5.3 What are key consequences of exits of venture capital 
funded startups for regional development? 
This thesis finds reason to reinterpret the role venture capitalists play in our economy. 
Contemporary narratives often frame venture capitalists as facilitators of accelerated growth 
for startups and midwifes of new public companies such as Google and Facebook (Florida & 
Kenney, 1988; Gompers et al, 2010; Lerner et al, 2012). However, the significant dominance 
of acquisition exits, relative rarity of IPOs and priming of venture capital funded startups 
towards acquisition stand in stark contrast to this narrative. The economic role venture 
capitalists play is thus primarily as a sourcing mechanism for incumbents, injecting them with 
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new products, technology, IP and talent packaged as startups, rather than facilitating the 
emergence of new public companies.  
Implications of this reframing, is that venture capitalists are more important in revitalizing the 
competitiveness of existing industry clusters, than in birthing new industry clusters. For 
regions that wish to grow new industry clusters, using venture capital as a tool for financing 
and accelerating the growth of their startups may thus yield different results and unintended 
consequences than hoped for. 
With this reframing in mind, and going back to the thesis question and purpose of this thesis, 
regions may wish to reconsider current policies that use venture capital as a tool for regional 
development. The policies of the last decades with regions trying to replicate the Silicon 
Valley model of venture capital accelerating startups, have clearly not yielded the intended 
long-term results. As this thesis demonstrates, exit patterns for venture capital funded startups 
favor Silicon Valley - even in regions other than Silicon Valley (Migration study). Venture 
capital is a market economy mechanism which accelerates growth of portfolio companies, but 
there are long-term consequences that manifest when employing the model in regions other 
than Silicon Valley, as this thesis demonstrates. 
Policy makers should approach venture capital policies with due caution. As we live in a 
market economy, venture capitalism should be allowed to operate freely. Venture capital 
scholars have warned against governments tampering with venture capitalists business models 
and decision making, as it can lead to disrupting market forces (Lerner, 2009). However, in 
some regions, such as in Europe, a considerable part of the financing of venture capital comes 
from public sources (Höppner, 2015). Policy makers should consider if these massive capital 
allocations to private venture capital funds is in the interest of regional development, and if 
that capital could be allocated for greater effect in through alternative funding mechanisms.  
Examples of alternatives are other equity investors such as business angels, family offices and 
crowdfunding, and non-equity solutions such as loans. In this thesis, business angel co-
investing with venture capital increased the likelihood of a local exit (Migration study). 
Business angels were also expected to be more resilient in continuing to invest over time than 
venture capitalists (Ecosystem study). Family offices and crowdfunding, should arguable have 
more in common with business angels than venture capitalists. More research is needed on 
other forms of equity financing and loans offered to startups. Focus should be on how 
different financing solutions influence the long-term development of firms, rather than short-
term growth and profitability. 
Finally, there is a tendency in theory to overgeneralize venture capitalist behavior, while there 
evidently is heterogeneity (VC Choice study). Certain subgroups within venture capitalists, 
for instance corporate venture capitalists and government venture capitalists, may have 
different exit preferences such as favoring local exits, than typical private venture capital 
funds. Future studies should explore the variation among different types of venture capitalists 
in exit preferences and behavior. With better understanding, policies can be designed for 
greater effect. Until then, policy makers are cautioned not to double down on past policies.  
 28 
 
6 Conclusions 
6.1 Implications for scholars 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the suitability of venture capital for regional 
development, by studying the long-term and post-exit outcome for venture capital funded 
startups. I find that although venture capital funding accelerates startups in the short-term, it 
also primes them for acquisitions. These acquisitions lead to various degrees of post-exit 
consolidation of the former startups, as they are absorbed by the acquiring incumbents. For 
most regions other than Silicon Valley, this post-exit consolidation leads to a considerable 
migration of the operations of the former startups from their regions of origin to other regions.  
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution by bringing transparency to previous unexamined 
startup exit patterns of venture capital funded startups, thereby contributing individually to, 
and bridging between, venture capital, entrepreneurship and regional development theory. 
Generalizable pattern are identified across five entrepreneurial regions, while unveiling the 
unique competitive advantage that Silicon Valley has in acquiring the most valuable startups 
on a global basis. Furthermore, I explain the chain of events likely to occur following a 
venture capitalist’s investment in a startup, as well as the long-term consequences and end 
outcome stakeholders can expect. 
I find reason to reinterpret the role venture capitalists play in our economy. Venture capitalists 
are often depicted as facilitators of accelerated growth for startups and midwifes of new 
public (Florida & Kenney, 1988; Gompers et al, 2010; Lerner et al, 2012). However, the 
significant dominance of acquisition exits, relative rarity of IPOs and priming of venture 
capital funded startups towards acquisition stand in stark contrast to this narrative. Venture 
capitalists play a more important role as sourcing mechanism for incumbents, injecting them 
with new products, technology, IP and talent packaged as startups, rather than facilitating the 
emergence of new public companies. The dependence on incumbents that can acquire their 
portfolio startups, makes venture capitalists primarily a mechanism for revitalizing existing 
industry clusters, than giving birth to new industry clusters where there are no incumbents yet. 
 
6.2 Implications for practitioners 
As venture capitalists usually have extensive control rights, including contractual exit control, 
they effectively hold the remaining shareholders and stakeholders of the startup hostage. The 
venture capitalists decides the exit route, and thereby post-exit format and growth trajectory 
of the startup, but also the profit for all shareholders that sell their shares at the same time as 
the venture capitalist. Entrepreneurs and other stakeholders in startups should be cognizant of 
the likely long-term consequences of venture capital funding, which in the past have been far 
from transparent.  
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For policy makers, this thesis may be a rude awakening in unveiling both unexpected and 
unintended consequences of policies using venture capital for regional development. Policy 
makers should consider if their present policies for regional growth are the most efficient 
means of achieving their goals. If in doubt, they should map the exit patterns of their region. 
If their exit patterns are not to their liking, or not in alignment with their policies, policy 
makers should consider going back to the drawing board and rethink their policies taking the 
specific exit patterns of their region into account.  
A problem for policy makers may be that, although our understanding of the long-term 
consequences of venture capital funding of startups may be lacking, the long-term 
consequences of other alternative funding sources such as business angels, family offices and 
crowdfunding, are also uncertain. These alternative funding sources may yield different long-
term growth trajectories, but we do not know and it requires study. Most startups will use a 
mix of funding sources, which makes untangling causality challenging to say the least. Future 
research will be needed to bring clarity to the alternatives to venture capital funding. 
Finally, policy should take a longer time perspective on startup and ecosystem development. 
As discussed in this thesis, venture capital has a short to mid-term accelerating effect on 
startups, while long-term priming them for acquisition. From a five to ten year perspective, 
promoting the use of venture capital may thus be a productive approach to stimulating growth. 
However from a twenty to thirty year perspective, this approach may also results in most of 
these firms no longer found operating in their region of origin. The complexity of growing 
regional economies and entrepreneurial ecosystems needs to be understood in this longer time 
perspective, which should to be reflected in present policies and future research studies. 
 
6.3 Future research 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of cross-disciplinary and mixed methods research on 
a system level to understand long-term consequences of policies. Furthermore, the importance 
of exits in determining the growth trajectory and final outcome for startups should now be 
clear. Further research into exits and related topics is needed. As an example, the low 
threshold stock exchanges (MTFs) which were unique to Sweden, offer an interesting new 
avenue of research of how new exit avenues may facilitate increased long-term growth. 
Research on venture capitalist has so far neglected to recognize the heterogeneity among 
venture capitalists. Although a pattern for venture capital exits was statistically verified in the 
quantitative studies, the VC Choice study also revealed a variation among the venture 
capitalists. Future studies should investigate how diverse the population of venture capitalists 
is, and if there are distinct subgroups in the population that act differently and create different 
value. One interesting avenue is to investigate if there are commonalities among the few 
venture capitalists that take startups public with some regularity. If so, they could be a 
subgroup which could potentially be supported in policies aimed at creating more public 
companies. 
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Entrepreneurial finance has in the past been more focused on supply side than demand side 
problems. The challenges entrepreneurs face has a greater depth than just finding capital. All 
types of funding come with an agenda and strings attached that influence firm development. 
Research is needed on how different financing solutions influence the long-term development 
of firms. In this long-term context, other equity funding sources that venture capitalist, such as 
business angels, family offices and crowdfunding, warrant more future research. 
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated the importance of industry to exits and by extension 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and cluster dynamics. Future research should explore how 
entrepreneurial ecosystems and clusters have different growth trajectories based on the 
industries that consist of. For instance, are life science cluster more resilient and grow faster 
than enterprise software clusters, gaming clusters or consumer electronics cluster.  
Future research into regional growth and entrepreneurial ecosystems need to be cognizant of 
the complexity in clusters blending inherently different industry mechanics, the long-term 
dynamics of regions and ecosystems that that may require decades of data to study and the 
interdependence of regions that highlight the need for international and interregional studies.   
 31 
 
7 References 
Acs ZJ. 2008. Foundations of High Impact Entrepreneurship. Now Publishers Inc. 
Acs ZJ, Audretsch DB, Lehmann EE. 2013. The knowledge spillover theory of 
entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics 41(4): 757-774. 
Audretsch, D. B., & Feldman, M. P. (1996). Innovative clusters and the industry life 
cycle. Review of industrial organization, 11(2), 253-273. 
Anokhin, S. (2013). Venture migration: a quest for a low-hanging fruit?. Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development, 25(5-6), 423-445. 
Ashcroft B, Coppins B, Raeside R. 1994. The regional dimension of takeover activity in the 
United Kingdom. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 41(2): 163-175. 
Audretsch DB, Keilbach MC, Lehmann EE. 2006. Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth. 
Oxford University Press. 
Blank, S., & Dorf, B. (2012). The startup owner's manual: The step-by-step guide for building 
a great company. BookBaby.   
Baumol WJ. 1996. Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive. Journal of 
Business Venturing 11(1): 3-22. 
Bayar O, Chemmanur TJ. 2011. IPOs versus acquisitions and the valuation premium puzzle: a 
theory of exit choice by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 46(6): 1755-1793. 
Berglund, H. (2011). Early stage venture capital investing: comparing California and 
Scandinavia. Venture Capital, 13(2), 119-145. 
Bhagat S, Shleifer A, Vishny RW, Jarrel G. Summers, L. 1990. Hostile Takeovers in the 
1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
1990: 1–84. 
Bienz C, Leite TE. 2008. A pecking order of venture capital exits. SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=916742. 
Birch DGW. 1979. The job generation process. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1510007.  
Birch DGW. 1987. Job creation in America: How our smallest companies put the most people 
to work. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial 
Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. 
Block, J. H., Colombo, M. G., Cumming, D. J., & Vismara, S. (2018). New players in 
entrepreneurial finance and why they are there. Small Business Economics, 50(2), 239-
250. 
Brau JC, Francis B, Kohers N. 2003. The choice of IPO versus takeover: Empirical 
evidence. The Journal of Business 76(4): 583-612. 
Brown R, Mason C. 2014. Inside the high-tech black box: A critique of technology 
entrepreneurship policy. Technovation 34(12): 773–784.  
Brown R, Mason C, Mawson S. 2014. Increasing 'the Vital 6 Percent': Designing effective 
public policy to support high growth firms. Nesta working paper series 14/01. Nesta. 
Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/1893/18296. 
Brown R, Mawson S, Mason C. 2017. Myth-busting and entrepreneurship policy: the case of 
high growth firms. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 29(5–6): 414–443. 
Bygrave WD, Hay MG, Peeters JB. (eds.). 1994. Realizing Investment Value. Pitman. 
 32 
 
Carpentier C, Suret JM. 2014. Post-investment migration of Quebec venture‐capital‐backed 
new technology-based firms. Canadian Journal of Regional Science 37(13): 71-80. 
Cochrane JH. 2005. The risk and return of venture capital. Journal of Financial 
Economics 75(1): 3-52. 
Cumming D. 2008. Contracts and exits in venture capital finance. The Review of Financial 
Studies 21(5): 1947-1982. 
Cumming D, Johan SA. 2008. Preplanned exit strategies in venture capital. European 
Economic Review 52(7): 1209-1241. 
Cumming D, Johan S. 2017. The problems with and promise of entrepreneurial 
finance. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 11(3): 357-370. 
Cumming D, Fleming G, Schwienbacher A. 2006. Legality and venture capital exits. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 12(2): 214-245. 
Cumming DJ, MacIntosh JG. 2003. A cross-country comparison of full and partial venture 
capital exits. Journal of Banking & Finance 27(3): 511-548. 
Dahlstrand ÅL. 2017. Large firm acquisitions, spin-offs and links in the development of 
regional clusters of technology-intensive SMEs. In High-Technology Clusters, 
Networking and Collective Learning in Europe, Keeble D, Wilkinson F (eds). 
Routledge: 156-181. 
Davenport S. 2009. Where Does International Entrepreneurship End?: Exploring 
Entrepreneurial Exit from Internationalised SMEs Through Trade Sales. Victoria 
Management School: Wellington, NZ. 
De Clerq D, Fried VH, Lehtonen O, Sapienza HJ. 2006. An entrepreneur’s guide to the 
venture capital galaxy. Academy of Management Perspectives 20(3): 90-112. 
Davidsson P, Henrekson M. 2002. Determinants of the prevalence of start-ups and high-
growth firms. Small Business Economics 19(2): 81-104. 
Delmar F, Davidsson P, Gartner WB. 2003. Arriving at the high-growth firm. Journal of 
Business Venturing 18(2): 189-216. 
Duruflé G, Hellmann TF, Wilson KE. 2017. From start-up to scale-up: examining public 
policies for the financing of high-growth ventures. SSRN: 
Florida RL, Kenney M. 1988. Venture capital, high technology and regional 
development. Regional Studies 22(1): 33-48. 
Gompers PA. 1995. Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. The 
Journal of Finance 50(5): 1461-1489. 
Gompers PA. 1996. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry. Journal of Financial 
Economics 42(1): 133-156. 
Gompers PA, Lerner J. 1999. What drives venture capital fundraising? NBER working paper 
w6906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Available at: 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w6906. 
Gompers, P. A., Gornall, W., Kaplan, S. N., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2019). How do venture 
capitalists make decisions?. Journal of Financial Economics. 
Gompers P, Kovner A, Lerner J, Scharfstein D. 2010. Performance persistence in 
entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics 96(1): 18-32.  
Granstrand O, Sjölander S. 1990. The acquisition of technology and small firms by large 
firms. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 13(3): 367-386. 
 33 
 
Harrison, R. T., & Mason, C. M. (1999). An overview of informal venture capital 
research. Venture Capital, 1, 95-100.  
Harrison, R. T., Mason, C., & Smith, D. (2015). Heuristics, learning and the business angel 
investment decision-making process. Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, 27(9-10), 527-554. 
Hellmann T, Puri M. 2002. Venture capital and the professionalization of start‐up firms: 
Empirical evidence. The Journal of Finance 57(1): 169-197. 
Henrekson M, Johansson D. 2010. Gazelles as job creators: a survey and interpretation of the 
evidence. Small Business Economics 35(2): 227-244. 
Hochberg YV. 2011. Venture capital and corporate governance in the newly public 
firm. Review of Finance 16(2): 429-480. 
Hochberg YV, Ljungqvist A, Lu Y. 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital networks 
and investment performance. The Journal of Finance 62(1): 251-301. 
Hogan T, DeTienne DR, Hutson E, Smith D. 2018. The role of high-tech acquisitions in the 
regional economy: Evidence from Ireland. Presented at the 3rd Entrepreneurial Finance 
Conference (EntFin) in Politecnico di Milano, Italy. 26-27 June 2018. 
Hopkins P, Richmond, K. 2014. The role of sales and acquisitions in company growth in 
Scotland. Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary 38(2): 96–107. 
Höppner D. 2015. More unicorns, More VC. Invest Europe 2 December. 
www.investeurope.eu [2017]. 
Invest Europe. 2019. Fundraising data analysis, 2018 Key Findings. Retrieved October 23 
from https://www.investeurope.eu/research/data-and-insight/fundraising/ 
Isaksson A. (1998, June). Venture capital exit behaviour in Sweden. In 10th Nordic 
Conference on Small Business research, Växjö University, Växjö, Sweden. Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Anders_Isaksson2/publication/251606592_Ventur
e_Capital_Exit_Behaviour_in_Sweden/links/565f07ac08ae4988a7bdfd6c.pdf. 
Isaksson A, 2006. Studies on the venture capital process. Ph.D. dissertation, Umeå School of 
Business, Umeå, SE. 
Kane TJ. 2010. The importance of startups in job creation and job destruction. Available at 
SSRN 1646934. 
Karaomerlioglu DC, Jacobsson S. 2000. The Swedish venture capital industry: an infant, 
adolescent or grown-up? Venture Capital: An international Journal of Entrepreneurial 
Finance 2(1): 61-88. 
Kaplan SN, Strömberg, P. 2003. Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An 
empirical analysis of venture capital contracts. The Review of Economic Studies 70(2): 
281-315. 
Kortum S, Lerner J. 2001. Does venture capital spur innovation?. In Entrepreneurial inputs 
and outcomes: New studies of entrepreneurship in the United States, Libecap GD (ed). 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited: 1-44. 
Leibenstein H. 1968. Entrepreneurship and development. The American Economic 
Review 58(2): 72-83. 
Leigh R. North DJ. 1978. Regional aspects of acquisition activity in British manufacturing 
industry. Regional Studies 12(2): 227-245.  
 34 
 
Lerner J. 2009. Boulevard of broken dreams: why public efforts to boost entrepreneurship and 
venture capital have failed--and what to do about it. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, NJ. 
Lerner J, Leamon A, Hardymon F. 2012. Venture Capital, Private Equity, and the Financing 
of Entrepreneurship. John Wiley and Sons: New York, NY.  
Lerner J, Sorensen M, Strömberg P. 2009. What drives private equity activity and success 
globally. Globalization of Alternative Investments Working Papers Vol. 2, World 
Economic Forum, Geneva, CH. 
Lerner J, Tåg J. 2013. Institutions and venture capital. Industrial and Corporate Change 22(1): 
153-182. 
MacIntosh JG, 1997. Venture capital exits in Canada and the United States. In Financing 
Growth in Canada, Halpern PJ (ed). University of Calgary Press: Calgary, CA: 279-
356. 
Makinen M, Haber D, Raymundo A. 2012. Acqui-hires for growth: planning for 
success. Venture Capital Review 2012: 31-42. 
Mason C, Brown R. 2013. Creating good public policy to support high-growth firms. Small 
Business Economics 40(2): 211-225. 
Mason CM, Harrison RT. 2006. After the exit: Acquisitions, entrepreneurial recycling and 
regional economic development. Regional Studies 40(1): 55-73. 
Nightingale P, Coad A. 2013. Muppets and gazelles: political and methodological biases in 
entrepreneurship research. Industrial and Corporate Change 23(1): 113-143. 
OECD. 2001. Science Technology and Industry Outlook. Special Edition. OECD Publishing: 
Paris, FR. 
OECD. 2010a. SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation. OECD Studies on SMEs and 
Entrepreneurship, OECD Publishing: Paris, FR. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264080355-en. 
OECD. 2010b. High-growth enterprises: What governments can do to make a difference, 
OECD studies on SMEs and entrepreneurship. OECD Publishing: Paris, FR. 
OECD. 2010c. Information Technology Outlook. OECD Publishing: Paris, FR.  
Poulsen AB, Stegemoller M. 2008. Moving from private to public ownership: selling out to 
public firms versus initial public offerings. Financial Management 37(1): 81-101. 
Puri M, Zarutskie R. 2012. On the life cycle dynamics of venture‐capital‐and non‐venture‐
capital‐financed firms. The Journal of Finance 67(6): 2247-2293. 
Rindermann, G. (2003). Venture capitalist participation and the performance of IPO firms: 
empirical evidence from France, Germany, and the UK. 
Rosenberg D. 2002. Cloning Silicon Valley: the next generation high-tech hotspots. Pearson 
Education.  
Ryder B. 2014. The scale-up nation: Israel is trying to turn its Davids into Goliaths. The 
Economist 11 December. Available from: 
https://www.economist.com/business/2014/12/11/the-scale-up-nation [2017]. 
Sahlman WA. 1990. The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations. Journal of 
Financial Economics 27(2): 473-521. 
Sawicki A. 2014. Buying teams. Seattle UL Review 38: 651. 
Saxenian, A. (1996). Regional advantage. Harvard University Press. 
 35 
 
Schumpeter JA. 1934. The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, 
credit, interest, and the business cycle, Vol. 55. Transaction publishers. 
Shane SA. 2008. The illusions of entrepreneurship: The costly myths that entrepreneurs, 
investors, and policy makers live by. Yale University Press: New Haven, US. 
Shane S. 2009. Why encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is bad public policy. 
Small Business Economics 33(2): 141-149. 
Schwienbacher A. 2008. Innovation and venture capital exits. The Economic 
Journal 118(533): 1888-1916. 
Stam E. 2007. Why butterflies don‘t leave: Locational behavior of entrepreneurial 
firms. Economic Geography 83(1): 27-50. 
Stuart TE, Sorenson O. 2003. Liquidity events and the geographic distribution of 
entrepreneurial activity. Administrative Science Quarterly 48(2): 175-201. 
Storey DJ, Tether BS. 1998. New technology-based firms in the European Union: an 
introduction. Research Policy 26(9): 933-946. 
Sørensen, M. (2007). How smart is smart money? A two‐sided matching model of venture 
capital. The Journal of Finance, 62(6), 2725-2762. 
Turok I, Richardson R. 1991. External takeovers of Scottish companies in the 1980s. Area 
23(1): 73-81. 
Wasserman, N. (2003). Founder-CEO succession and the paradox of entrepreneurial 
success. Organization Science, 14(2), 149-172. 
Wennberg K, Mason C. 2018. Financial exits: perspectives, regional development and policy 
interventions. Project Report. Swedish Agency for Growth Policy Analysis, Östersund, 
SE. 
Wiltbank R, Dew N, Read S. 2015. Investment and returns in successful entrepreneurial sell-
outs. Journal of Business Venturing Insights 3: 16-23. 
World Economic Forum. 2011. Global entrepreneurship and the successful growth strategies 
of early-stage companies. World Economic Forum, US. 
World Economic Forum. 2009. The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2009: 
Globalization of Alternative Investments. Working Papers Vol. 2. World Economic 
Forum. 
Xiao J. 2015. The effects of acquisition on the growth of new technology-based firms: Do 
different types of acquirers matter? Small Business Economics 45(3): 487-504. 
